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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

GEORGE WILLIAM BURTON,

Case No.

17252

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction for two counts of
Theft, Second Degree Felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-6-404 (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, GEORGE WILLIAM BURTON, was charged in an
Information with two counts of Theft, felonies of the second degree
in

violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended).

On the 14th day of July, 1980, the appellant was convicted by a
jury of both counts as charged in the Information.

On the 1st day

of August, 1980, the appellant was sentenced to incarceration in
the Utah State Prison to two indeterminate terms of one to
fifteen years,
said
terms
toFunding
runfor digitization
concurrently.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant, GEORGE WILLIAM BURTON, seeks reversal
of the judgment entered against him and a new trial in the
above-entitled matter.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The appellant was convicted of two counts of Theft.
Count I was fo=

:~ef[

of a Vehicle, and Count II was for Theft

of Property, such property being valued at over $1,000.00.
Salt Lake City Police Officer Charles Oliver testified that
at approximately 9:15 p.m. on April 11, 1980, he spotted a
westbound car on 1300 South which matched the description of
a car reported as stolen an hour earlier.

After a two block

"chase," the vehicle pulled over into a parking lot at 1148 South
and 300 West, and the appellant was discovered to be the driver.
(T. 42-47)

Cliff Bowden, the owner of the car,

testified that

he saw the appellant drive the vehicle away from the home of
Elver Langdon, located at 48 South and 600 West, around 8:00 p.m.

(T. 6, 35)
Not disputing most of the above facts,

the appellant

testified that he had been drinking large amounts of alcohol
with an acquaintance, one "Crazy Fish," during the day in questior
(T. 71)

Towards evening the two drove in the appellant's car

to the house where he resided with his mother, located at 258
North 800 West, "to get some more cash, money, and something to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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eat." (T. 72, 79)

While the appellant was in the house,

Crazy Fish drove off in the appellant's car and the appellant
pursued him on foot, heading south.
discovering a car with keys in the

(T. 72, 73)

Upon

ignition, the appellant

drove off in that car in pursuit of Crazy Fish.

(T. 73)

The appellant testified that he then drove to Perkins,
at 900 South State, where he had met Crazy Fish earlier

in the

day, talked to several people at Perkin's asking if anyone had
seen Crazy Fish or the car, and then drove around the area
between 900 South and 1300 South, and West Temple and
300 West, where he believed Crazy Fish lived.

(T. 74)

The

appellant stated that he did not at any time intend to steal
the car, and was, in fact, driving back to where he had found
it, in order to leave it
pulled over and arrested.

"in the neighborhood" when he was
(T. 75)

Kathy Murray, a foster sister to the appellant,
corroborated his testimony in the following particulars.

That

the appellant and Crazy Fish were together on the day in question,
and were intoxicated; that she saw Crazy Fish drive off in the
appellant's car; that she saw the appellant pursue Crazy Fish
on foot; and that the appellant's car was found on the evening
of April 11th crashed into a telephone pole.

(T. 60-63)

The appellant did not raise the defense of voluntary
intoxication, and therefore objected to Instruction 16-B on

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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voluntary intoxication.

The appellant also excepted to the

Court's failure to give a reasonable hypothesis instruction,
which was

properly requested in writing.

(T.

98)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY
INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE DEFENSE OF VOLUNTARY
INTOXICATION.
Count I of the Information charged the appellant with
Theft

o~

a Vehicle.

Jury Instruction No. 15 instructed the

jury on the lesser included offense of Unlawful Taking of a
Vehicle, which is a misdemeanor.

The element of specific intent

to deprive the owner of his property is required for Theft of
a Vehicle, while an intent merely to temporarily deprive the
owner of possession of his property would constitute Unlawful
Taking of a Vehicle.

This issue was of critical importance

in the present case, where the appellant admitted that he
unlawfully took Cliff Bowden's vehicle, but denied any intent
to steal the car.
The appellant's theory of the case, as outlined in
the facts above, is that he just used Cliff Bowden's car for
a short while, in order to search for his own car, and that he
was in fact returning the car when arrested.

The fact of appellar.:

intoxication was only relevant to explain the circumstances
under which he took Cliff Bowden's car, and was never claimed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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by the appellant as a defense or an "excuse" for his actions.

However, Jury Instruction No. 16-B, given by the court upon
request of the State, and over defense counsel's objection,
could Nery easily have confused and misled the jury into
thinking that the appellant had raised the defense of voluntary
intoxication and was offering his intoxication as the sole
excuse for his conduct.

That instruction provided:

INSTRUCTION 16-B.
Voluntary intoxication from alcohol
or drugs is not a defense to the charge
being considered unless the intoxication
negates the existence of the mental
state which is an element of the offense
and which in the ca:se now before the
court is that the defendant acted with
a purpose to deprive an individual of
his property. Being under the influence
of alcohol or drugs is no excuse for the
commission of a crime where it merely
makes a person more excited or reckless,
so that one does things one might not
otherwise have done. To be a defense
to such a crime, one must be so under
the influence of alcohol that at the time
of the alleged offense he did not know
what he was then doing, so that he was
then and there incapable of forming the
necessary intent.
It is a well settled principle of law that a defendant
has a right to have

his theory of the case presented to the jury

in the form of instructions, at least where such theory is
reasonably justified by the evidence, in a "clear and understandable way."

1.
State v. Stenback, 78 Utah 350, 2 P. 2d 1050 (1931); State v.
Mccumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Ut. 1980); State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75
(Ut. 1981); State v. Castillo, 23 Ut.2d 70, 457 P.2d 618 (1969)
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1

It is equally clear that ''[t]he purpose of an instruction is to
2
An instruction which is confusing, rather
enlighten a jury. "
than enlightening is properly refused.
on the defense of voluntary

Specificall.J, an instruct>

intoxication is proper in those

instances, and only in those instances, where "there has been
evidence of alcohol intoxication which bears uoon the issue of
3
a reguired specific intent."
(Emphasis supplied)
The intoxication of the appellant in the ?resent case
had absolutel7 no bearing upon the issue of specific intent,
since the defense of voluntary intoxication was never asserted
by the appellant--that is, the appellant never sought to negate
the specific intent element by reason of this intoxication.
And while the second sentence of Instruction No. 16-B in light
of the facts presented at trial, may have been a proper warning
that intoxication is no excuse for the cormnission of a crime,

4I

the first and last sentences of that instruction were definitely
improper.

Each of these sentences informs the jury under

which circumstances voluntary intoxication is a defense to a
crime.

2.

Sandwiched in between is the sentence disallowing

intoxicati:~

State v. Selgado, 76 N.M. 187, 413 P.2d 469, 471 (1966)

3.
Statev. James, 223 Kan. 107, 574P.2d181, 185 (1977); See a.
State v. Potter, supra.
4.
The appellant is not hereby conceding that the second sent~~
of Instruction No. 16-B was proper, but is merely assuming so,
in arguendo. For in fact, intoxication was not even offered as
an excuse for the misdeed, but merely one of the circumstances
describing the defendant's actions that day.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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as an excuse for criminal activity, thus creating a strong
overall impression that the appellant was trying to excuse and
defend his conduct because of his intoxicated state, and that
the jury must not accept the excuses or defenses offered by
the appellant.
In a slightly different

context, in State v. Potter, 5

this court held that confusing and misleading jury instructions
on voluntary intoxication constituted prejudicial error.

There,

the defendant raised the defense of voluntary intoxication and
proposed several jury instructions on that defense, all of which
were denied.

Instead, the trial court gave general instructions

on the intent requirements of the crimes charged and the effect
of intoxication upon the defendant's criminal culpability.
In reversing the conviction, this court reasoned that "the
instructions given in the present case were so general that
they could have misled and confused the jury," and

5.

See footnote 1, supra.
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[b]ecause the instructions given in
the present case failed to explain
adequately the distinction between the
general and specific intent requirements
or relate those requirements to the facts
of the case and the different crimes
charged, they were misleading and
confusing.6
Elaborating further, the court explained that because the
instructions on intent and voluntary intoxication were so
general and not related to the facts of the case, they:
could have left the jury in a state of
confusion or even with the impression
~hat as a matter of law the defendant's
voluntary intoxication could have no
7
effect on the criminality of his conduct.
In that case the court concluded that, for the reasons given abo•ie
The instructions failed to present to
the jury in a clear and understandable
manner the substance of the defense
advocated by the defendant. The
instructions thus constitute error which
was prejudicial to the defendant and
deprived him of a fair trial.8
In the present case, the instruction on voluntary
intoxication presented a theory of the case advanced by neither
the appellant nor the state (the defense of voluntary intoxication'
and then negated that theory.

This may well have confused and

misled the jury into thinking that the defense of voluntary

6.

Id. at 78

7.

Id. at 80

8.
Id., citing State v. Day, 90 N.M. 154, 560 P.2d 945 (1977),
People-v. Cesare, 68 A.D.2d 938, 414 N.Y.S. 2d 585 (1979),
People v. Maliskey, 77 Mich.App. 444, 258 N.W. 2d 514 (1977).
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intoxication was the primary issue for it to decide.

This is

particularly true since Instruction No. 16-B was couched in terms
nf 'Toluntary intoxication being no "defense."

The instruction on voluntary intoxication was improper.
lt was prejudicial because it may have confused and misled the
jury, and :ailed to allow the appellant to present his theory
of the case to the jury.

Consequently, the trial court's

giving of that instruction constituted reversible error.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY
REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE REASONABLE
ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS REQUIREMENT.
Although the State's case on Count I of the Information,
Theft of a Vehicle, was based on some direct evidence (the
appellant testified himself that he took the car without permission),
the State's case on Count II, involving theft of property claimed
by Cliff Bowden to have been inside the car before it was taken,
was based entirely on circumstantial evidence.

None of the

alleged stolen property was ever discovered, and there was no
evidence that the appellant had handled, moved or sold any such
property.

The entire case against the appellant on Count II was

Cliff Bowden's testimony that such property existed, was in the
car before the appellant drove off, and was missing when the car
was recovered.

Even the valuation of the property was

determined solely by Cliff Bowden's testimony.

And by Mr. Bowden's

cestimony, the car sat, unlocked and unattended, for some 10 or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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15 minutes in front of the Langdon home before the appellant
took it.

The appellant's testimony was that the car sat for a

similar period in front of Perkin's while he was inside
questioning people as to the whereabouts of his own car.

The

evidence presented relevant to Count II, therefore, was entireli"
circumstantial.
The appellant excepted to the trial court's failure
to give the last paragraph of appellant's proposed Instruction
No. 2, on th.e reasonable alternative hypothesis.

This ?aragrapt

stated:
To warrant you in convicting the
defendant, the evidence must to your
minds exclude every reasonable
hypothesis other than that of the guilt
of the defendant. That is to say, if
after an entire consideration and
comparison of all the testimony in the
case you can reasonably explain the facts
given in evidence on any reasonable ground
other than the guilt of the defendant,
you should acquit him.
This instruction is entirely consistent with the law
as stated originally in State v. Crawford,9 that:
[T]he rule applied in cases dependent
solely upon circumstantial evidence, as
in the case at bar, [is] that the
circumstances must be such as to
exclude every reasonable hypothesis
except that of the defendant's guilt
of the offense charged.

9.
59 Utah 39, 201 P.1030, 1033 (1921). See also State v. Erwir
120 P.2d 285, 302 (1941); State v. Marasco 81 Utah 325, 17 P.'fcl
919 (1933).
.
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It further appears that this rule of law,

in circumstantial

evidence cases, must be explained to the jury:
It has long been the law in this
jurisdiction that the giving of
such an instruction [the reasonable
alternative hypothesis] is neither
appropriate nor required unless the
proof of a material issue is based
solely upon circumstantial evidence.lo
In discussing the same issue, this court in State v. Schad,
~70

P.2d 246, 247

(Ut. 1970), used the following reasoning:

It is true, as the defendant contends,
that where a conviction is based on
circumstantial evidence, the evidence
should be looked upon with caution,
and that it must exclude every reasonable
hypothesis except the guilt of the defendant.
This is entirely logical, because if the
jury believes that there is a reasonable
hypothesis in the evidence consistent
with the defendant's innocence, there would
naturally be a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt. Nevertheless, that proposition
does not apply to each circumstance
separately, but is a matter within the
prerogative of the jury to determine
from all of the facts and circumstances
shown; and if therefrom they are convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's
guilt, it necessarily follows that they
regarded the evidence as excluding every
other reasonable hypothesis.
However, this is only true if the jury specifically understands
that a reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence constitutes
a reasonable doubt.

10.
State v. Bender, 581 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Ut. 1978);
State v. Fort, 572 P.2d 1387 (Ut. 1977); State v. Garcia,
IT Ut.2d 67, 355 P.2d 57 (1960).
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In State v. Eagle,

11 this court, while seemingly

ignoring the case law cited in footnotes 9 and 10, supra,

highl:'

criticized the request of the defendant in that case for an
instruction on the reasonable alternative hypothesis, describing
any controversy over such an instruction as "nothin1:; more than a
tempest in a teapot."1 2

In so doing, the court stated:

The use of the reasonable alternative
hypothesis instruction is merely one
way of expressing that necessary burden
of proof and there is no apparent
reason to mandate that one, and only one,
particular instruction being used by
trial judges in conveying to the jury
the meaning of that elusive phrase,
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 13
And in State v. King, 14

after quoting the same paragraph

from Schad as appears above, the court stated:

Of course, the requested instructions
may make more understandable and
explicit the usual instruction on
burden of proof.
Thus, with all due respect, it appears that the

princ~h

reason that trial courts deny the reasonable alternative
hypothesis instruction is

because it too clearly informs the

jury of what the real burden of proof in a criminal case is.
It is undisputed that the reasonable alternative hypothesis
instruction is a correct statement of the law; and it is

11.

611 P.2d 1211 (Ut. 1980)

12.

Id. at 1213.

13.

Id.
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14.

604 P.2d 923, 926 (Ut. 1979).

admitted by this court that such an instruction helps clarify
the ourden of proof to the jury.

In fact, the only reason

this court has ever given for supporting a trial court's denial
of the instruction is the "tempest in a teapot" argument used
in Eagle--that the clarity the proposed instruction gives to
other burden of proof instructions would not make a significant
difference in the jury's deliberations.
If this instruction really does have an insignificant
impact on juries, why do prosecutors so vehemently oppose it,
and why, pray tell, are the trial judges constantly denying it,
when it correctly states the law and makes more clear to the
jury what its duty is?

And ultimately, why should this court

deny to a defendant his chance to inform the jury more clearly
as to the meaning of the "elusive phrase," "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt"?
In determining whether a failure to give a requested
instruction is prejudicial, the question is

whether "if the

requested instruction had been given and the jury had so
considered the evidence, there is a reasonable likelihood
that it may have had some effect on the verdict rendered." 15

15.

State v. Mitcheson, 560 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Ut. 1977)
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In the present case, where the appellant was only in possession
of the car which contained the missing property for one hour,
and where that car sat unlocked and unattended for 10-15
minutes on two separate occasions, and where no evidence
whatsoever was found connecting the appellant with the missing
property other than his possession of the vehicle, the jury
might well have thought it reasonably possible that someone
else stole the prooerty from the car.
instructed

t~at

And, not having been

:tis would constitute a reasonable doubt under

the law, the jury may have convicted the appellant in spite of
entertaining this possibility.

Therefore, under the Mitcheson

test, a reasonable likelihood exists that the failure to give
the requested instruction had an effect on the verdict rendered,
and such would constitute reversible error.
CONCLUSION
Since the appellant did not raise the defense of
voluntary intoxication, Instruction No. 16-B may have confused
and misled the jury in its deliberations.

This is particularly

true since the defense of lack of specific intent had been
raised on other grounds.

This error was prejudicial and requires

a reversal of the judgment.
The refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury
on the reasonable alternative hypothesis very likely resulted in
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confusing the jury as to the burden of proof.

And since the

evidence on Count II was entirely circumstantial and the case
against the appellant was weak, the denial of the requested
instruction may very well have affected the jury's decision.
For these reasons, the appellant's conviction on both counts
should be reversed, and the case remanded to the Third Judicial
District Court for a new trial.

Appellant
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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing
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was delivered to the Office of the

Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84114 this

day of August, 1981.
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